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1 Typically the field of modern South Asia studies assumes a division between processes of
British colonial state-formation across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, on the
one  hand,  and  the  resistant  activism  of  Indian  anticolonialism  on  the  other.  This
ideological divide has shaped the historiography of the field, with students of colonial
knowledge formation and scholars of (colonial) underdevelopment ranged against those
considered apologists for empire.
2 One  of  the  failings  of  this  scholarly  bifurcation  between  studying  the  state  versus
studying society is that it has privileged the latter at the cost of the former, and thereby
invested South Asian ‘society’ with a spurious reality of its own. A related result has been
that the historiography of South Asia has suffered from working with a static account of
the colonial state form. The colonial state transformed in the aftermath of the partial
devolution of power to Indians beginning with Lord Ripon’s Resolution of 1882 in favour
of local self-government, and more importantly following the Indian Councils Acts, better
known as the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. Among the results were a growing demand
for franchise,  and the rise of representative politics,  most keenly felt in urban areas,
which were witness to the growth of various forms of caste, class and religious politics,
including notably, of Hindu-Muslim violence. As such, assuming the universality of a mid
nineteenth-century avatar of the colonial state, instead of exploring the important ways
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in which it transformed and anticipated many features of the post-independent state, is
misleading.
3 The consequences have impacted not only the study of cities, which have typically been
subordinate to other spatial foci of study, principally region and nation, but also on the
study of  forms of  politics  that cut across the state and society divide such as Hindu
nationalism,  or  to  use  the  term prevalent  in  the  literature  until  relatively  recently,
communalism. Thus communalism was understood mainly as a result of colonial divide-
and-rule, and in the post-independence period, of competition between communities, and
of party machinations (Chandra 1984, Akbar 1991). Hence it was regarded as aberrant
rather  than as  reflecting  the  problem of  sovereignty  in  modern and in  postcolonial
contexts (Schmitt 1985, Cohn 1987: 632-682, Lefort 1988: 148-187). And in cases where
religious authority itself  is  dispersed rather than institutionalized,  as  for  example in
India, the ways in which sovereignty manifests can be revealing, as I will try to show.
Political-economic  and  social  policy  decisions  structure  environments  that  ordinary
people inhabit and participate in. Rather than assuming that politics, and by implication
political violence, are contingencies external to these environments, I argue that they
should  be  seen  as  due  to  the  structural  arrangement  of  built  environments  that
themselves reflect and reinforce prevailing historical tensions. 
4 In  this  paper  I  inquire  into  how the  disposition of  public  spaces,  and informal  oral
communication, can together create a common sense mobilizing support for spectacular
events of violence. A key aspect of this process is by naming exceptions to the generality
of circumstances viz., as Hindu and/or Muslim, as Gujarati and/or other, as belonging to
one or other distinct space, and so on. While particularist nomenclature is unsurprising
in  modernizing  contexts,  the  ways  in  which  it  can  get  embedded  in  modern  built
environments, and reproduced in popular perception, is noteworthy.
5 ‘The sovereign  is  he  who  defines  the  exception’, Carl  Schmitt has  written  (1985: 1). 
Schmitt pointed to the inability of a rule-bound liberal polity to respond adequately to
singular events or to prevent extraordinary circumstances from telescoping into crises.
The figure of the sovereign thus lurks beneath liberal democracies, despite the latter’s
conceit of having transcended older models of governance.
6 Now in formerly colonial countries, economic development is itself considered to be an
emergency condition requiring extraordinary initiatives. State leaders seldom hesitate to
justify invoking exceptions to prevailing rules, in the interests of the people as a whole.
What distinguishes the ‘Special Political Zone’ is the extent of popular participation in the
invocation of exception. Exceptionality may be invoked in religio-cultural, spatial and
regional registers, with social, political and economic implications that then follow. For
example, the widely prevalent notion in Ahmedabad, that Muslims are an unsanitary and
criminal-minded population, for most Hindus explains Muslims’ spatial segregation in
ghettos,  their  economic  marginalization,  their  political  subordination to  Hindus,  and
condones overt violence against Muslims as pedagogical or prophylactic.
7 In a preliminary way, my paper points to the ways in which the built form of the city,
urban  planning  and  resulting  forms  of  social  segregation,  and  popular  linguistic
practices, can combine to instantiate new political formations such as what I am calling a
Special Political Zone, where the form of rule exercised is both modern and democratic,
but undercut through exceptions which a majority of citizens participate in reproducing,
wittingly or unwittingly (Rajagopal 2010: 529-556). 
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8 The violence in Gujarat in 2002 represented the first attacks when a government led by
the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), both at state and at central levels, was
in  power.  Previous  episodes  of  violence  occurred  mainly  under  the  Congress-led
governments  that  sought  to  localize  the  effects  of  the  violence  and  downplay  its
significance. The BJP, by contrast, tried to nationalize the violence, endorsing the idea
that the killings of Muslims were spontaneous, popular and righteous, although violence
attributed to Muslims was supposedly anti-national and of Pakistani origin (Roy 2002:
3-17).
9 What resulted therefore was a paradoxical phenomenon, namely, a spectacle of violence
ostensibly  enacted by non-state  forces,  covertly  and overtly  sanctioned by the state.
Federalism, instead of being a way to limit centralized state authority, became a means to
make human rights violations into an internal matter for state governments, something
already witnessed in the Ayodhya case.2
10 Similarly, if ironically, Gujarat under the chief ministership of Narendra Modi has become
a  favoured  site  of  corporate  investment  and  a  model  of  efficient  pro-business
government, and Modi himself a prime ministerial candidate. The commanding heights of
economic policy are now being used for targeted and strategic purposes,  such as the
creation  of  Special  Economic  Zones  where  businesses  could  be  allowed  to  enclose
agricultural land, banking it for commercial use and increasing its value in the process,
while being relieved of the burden of labour and environmental laws, and indeed of most
revenue demands, in the hope that exports would grow and world-class infrastructures
would be created there.3
11 With the SEZ, the state makes exceptions to its rules not for reasons of national security,
or due to claims of a political emergency, but to enhance the material welfare of the
society as a whole. While the process is routine, the linguistic register claims sanction for
it (it  is ‘special’),  encoded in a form of speech that crowds everyday life,  namely the
abbreviation, that like VIP, MOU or RTI becomes a common noun, and an artefact of state
power that citizens have to negotiate.4
12 Where the application of select laws is formally suspended (e.g. ‘A Special Economic Zone 
shall [.  .  .]  be deemed to be a territory outside the customs territory of India for the
purposes of undertaking the authorized operations’),5 what results is an amorphous and
fluid landscape in which words such as SEZ offer lexical  purchase,  denoting singular
spaces where events are explained not so much by reference to the existing juridical
regime as through the name itself.6
13 Just as the laws of the land are exercised selectively for harnessing business initiatives in
national  development,  the  selective  enforcement  of  criminal  laws  in  this  Indian
interpretation  of  federalism may reflect  the  existence  of  special political  zones that
indicate not a uniform juridical regime but a mode of sovereignty, and a differentiated set
of relations between the sovereign and its subjects. What such historical circumstances
make possible therefore, although they do not guarantee it, is a strong leader who brooks
no opposition, and who transcends his or her party status; it is the leader who defines the
party in a given state rather than vice versa.
14 In bringing the existence of the special political zone into visibility, and rendering it into
a viable mechanism for neoliberal development, Gujarat can be considered not so much a
culmination of Hindutva as inaugurating a new phase of politics. Here, regionalism and
globalism can mesh together while avoiding the dead ends of erstwhile forms of cultural
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nationalism—that hold the literal-minded view that de facto Hindu supremacy should
achieve de jure  status. In  Gujarat,  we witness  the shrinkage of  political  process  and
regulatory oversight alongside claims of enlarged popular consent and administrative
efficacy. The capacity to transfer capital accrued in one domain to void penalties that are
technically non-negotiable and punishable by law may be due to a provisional success in
presenting  private  interests  as  universal  in  character. But  it  might  also  signal  an 
emergent and regionally-specific logic of identity formation even while Gujarati capital is
undergoing greater globalization. A reinforced local identity is thus here not the premise
for  capital  accumulation so  much as  its  result,  one that  is  mediated by anti-Muslim
violence.
15 A  special  political  zone  sanctions  the  treatment  of  the  space  within  it  as  highly
differentiated rather than as continuous or homogeneous space, the variations within it
able to be reconciled only by the constant invocation of exceptionality, anchored through
the perceptual mechanisms through which it is apprehended and claimed. In this article I
discuss the spatial as well as the spoken order of the city of Ahmedabad through which
the materiality of the city takes shape and acquires perceptual form, and indicate how the
city could become the enabling ground, the visible artefact as well, to some extent, as the
instrument of political violence (Rajagopal 2010: 529-556).
 
A riot-prone city
The impact [of the 2002 violence] on trade and
industry was negligible and transitory.
Gujarat State Industries Minister Suresh Mehta (
Times of India2002)
16 The statement from Gujarat State Industries Minister Suresh Mehta made a few weeks
after the most intense phase of the violence in 2002, that the impact of the violence was
negligible and transitory, contrasted with other statements frequently encountered, that
Ahmedabad was a riot-prone city, the milestones of whose recent history itself were all
too often related through a sequence of earlier riots—1941, 1969, 1985 and 1992—so that
to ask why this  had occurred was to display a lack of  perspicacity.  Where riots  had
occurred so often before, why would they not occur again?
17 Doing fieldwork in Gujarat not long after the violence of 2002, I was struck by how quickly
people  seemed to  accommodate  the fact  of  violence and explain it  with ready-made
accounts, often centering on the immiscible presence of Muslims, whose concentration in
ghettos seemed a reflection not on the city or the state but on Muslims themselves, and
the disharmony they allegedly generated. Many Muslims live in the old and formerly
walled  part  of  the  city,  but  over  time they  have  become metonyms for  each other,
symptoms of a problem that is neither exclusively spatial nor political.
18 The old walled city was seen as congested and dilapidated from at least the early 20th
century, and that was the focus of Patrick Geddes’ attention when he wrote his report on
Ahmedabad following his visit in 1915. The ramparts of the old city had been restored in
1832; the question before him as Geddes saw it was whether to follow the method of John
Ruskin and William Morris, which would demand restoration at any cost, or that chosen
by Baron Haussmann and his disciples, which would call for the summary removal of the
walls. Geddes urged that no effective city planning could be done unless a comprehensive
survey of all existing aspects of the city were assembled and studied. He recommended
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preserving the monumental  beauty of  the 500-year-old fortifications wherever it  was
practicable  to  do so,  keeping in  mind the living needs  of  residents  and pedestrians.
Geddes was mindful of what he called ‘the intensifying deterioration and squalor of the [.
.  .]  industrial  age.’  In some places he argued for the retention of the wall  where the
availability of funds (while Britain was fighting a war) might not permit its repair or
removal, noting, ‘[E]ast ends in India are apt to crowd and deteriorate, like east ends
elsewhere; it is thus not the mere presence of the wall which causes slum conditions or
overcrowding, and there is as little reason to hope that its removal would abate these
evils’ (Geddes 1915a).7
19 Ahmedabad indeed did adopt a third way for the walled city, neither that of Ruskin nor
that of Haussmann, although it was far from that which Geddes had envisioned. There
was  neither  architectural  romanticism,  nor  demolition  followed  by  grandiose
reconstruction,  but  instead,  demolition followed by preservation.  Local  elites,  led  by
Vallabhbhai  Patel,  took  over  the  Ahmedabad  Municipality  by  1919,  and  managed  to
mediate colonial intervention in city planning on their own terms. Old elites whose power
was based on local networks and were opposed to opening up the old city came together
with  newer  elites,  including  Vallabhbhai  Patel  and  Kasturbhai  Lalbhai,  who  saw  an
opportunity for popular mobilization that would win them a constituency in Ahmedabad,
as well as gain a measure of national prominence due to their anti-government stance
(Raychaudhuri 2001: 687-703).
20 The walls were eventually removed in 1940, but otherwise conditions in the old city were
left largely unchanged. Over time, the old city grew into a symbol of dysfunctionality in
Ahmedabad  and  at  the  same  time  provided  a  rationale  for  new  developments  that
strangely left the problem untouched. It was as if the old city enclosed a form of moral
pollution that had to be preserved as a way of underlining the relative purity of the
remainder of the city.
21 The walled city became a political symbol, and indexed not only a problem but a way of
thinking that became more entrenched as Ahmedabad grew. If invoking it was meant to
disparage the slum-like conditions of the poor, over time, references to the walled city
increasingly signalled Muslim habitations and the problems they allegedly brought in
their wake for Hindus, so that life in Ahmedabad was a defence against the threat it
represented. However, city surveys tended to ignore the distinction between Muslim and
Hindu settlements, because municipal authorities were supposed to be indifferent to the
distinction; successive city plans made no mention of it.8 Ward level census data was of
course in the government’s possession, which could show the relative concentrations of
Hindus and Muslims in each neighbourhood across the city,  and the ways these had
grown and  moved  over  time,  but  this  was  at  best  obliquely  alluded  to  in  city  plan
documents.9
22 Earlier a major centre of the textile industry, Ahmedabad’s economy is today dominated
by tertiary and informal sectors. The shift in the state away from textiles to chemical,
petrochemical and engineering industries since the 1980s has led to massive
informalization of the labour force on the one hand, and a shift of industries away from
Ahmedabad to South Gujarat on the other.10 This has disproportionately affected Muslims
and reinforced an ongoing trend of ghettoization.11
23 Relevant  here  is  the  influence  of  Gandhi  on  caste  reform  and  on  working  class
movements.  Gandhi’s  emphasis  on  ethical  awareness,  and  fiduciary  rather  than
conflictual  relations amongst Indians,  resulted in the absence of  lower caste political
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consciousness, and a union, the Textile Labour Association, that despite being the oldest
in the country, bore the distinction of never having called an industry-wide strike (All
India Trade Union Congress 1969: 7 and passim). As long as the business elite of the city
retained the ability to informally adjudicate political  disputes,  a measure of cohesion
prevailed.
24 Interestingly, each of the major movements in the state after independence was middle-
class led, and none of them highlighted issues of lower caste rights, unless they actually
opposed such rights. In this connection it should be noted that the Mahagujarat Andolan
(movement)  for  independent  statehood  (1956-60),  referred  to  by  many  activists  and
intellectuals as an inaugural political moment, led to a provincialization of state politics,
since the more cosmopolitan classes and the financial elite remained in Bombay. The 1969
anti-Muslim riots were sparked by the rumour of an attack on Ahmedabad’s Jagannath
temple, and led to the gravest Hindu communal violence after 1947, until that time. The
Nav Nirman (or  Reconstruction)  Movement  which began in 1974,  was  led by college
students; it agitated against inflation and political corruption, and led to the resignation
of then Chief Minister Chimanbhai Patel. Middle classes led the 1981 and 1985 agitations
against caste-based reservations since they feared they would lose their chance of secure
government jobs. The 1992 communal riots were led by upper caste Hindus, as were the
2002 violence against Muslims (A. Shah 1985: 29-37, Baxi 1985, G. Shah 1996: 165-170).
Taken together with the resolve of the organized labour union to avoid confrontational
politics,  the public spaces of  Ahmedabad were effectively dominated by Hindu upper
castes.
25 Over time, in the words of a Hindu photo journalist referring to the relationship between
growing  hostility  and  the  growing  physical  separation  of  Hindus  and  Muslims  in
Ahmedabad, ‘Dividation ho raha hai’—dividation began to occur.12 I heard the term more
than once. Preserving the verb (‘divide’) while making it into a noun connoted the active
process  behind the Latinate  construction.  Since  at  least  1969,  each major  episode of
violence,  in 1985,  1992 and 2002,  has led to further separation of  Hindu and Muslim
populations in the city, and increasing ghettoization of Muslims in a smaller number of
localities.
26 Michel de Certeau has observed that those who move through the spaces of a city—he was
referring to pedestrians, but we might extend the observation to others too—operate in
spaces that they cannot visualize; they are within built spaces that they use but, typically,
neither design nor choose (Patel, Padgaonkar & Verghese 2002: 6-7). In this sense, de
Certeau suggests, they ‘write’ the urban ‘text’ without being able to read it, much as if the
practices organizing a city were characterized by a certain blindness (de Certeau 1984:
Chapter 7). And similarly different bodies of people in their movement through the city
make different parts of the city vanish while enlarging and amplifying others; in this way
parallel urban texts can coexist for periods of time without explicit reference to each
other.
27 Space has its homogeneous aspects, which correspond to systematic logics and deliberate
strategies, such as, for example, those of class or communal stratification. On the other
hand, interferences between different spatial strata if not accommodated can grow over
time,  building  a  pent-up  force  that  periodically  gets  released,  sometimes  through
benevolent forms of city planning, or otherwise through destructive and explosive forms
that may either alter, reinforce or elaborate existing arrangements and patterns.
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The walled city and the production of ungovernability
28 Ahmedabad was founded by Sultan Ahmed Shah in 1411. Some of its most spectacular
monuments, such as the Jama Masjid built in 1423, are indubitably Muslim. Its largest
Muslim  neighbourhood  is  in  Juhapura  (formerly  Gyaspur),  to  the  southwest  and
technically  outside  city  limits,  but  across  the  road  from  what  is  colloquially  called
Vejalpur (itself technically within Juhapura), which is understood to be within the city.
Few, if any, city services are provided to Juhapura, however, unlike Vejalpur. Neither the
mosque nor Juhapura appears on many maps of  the city,  moreover.  A visitor to the
Masjid, which stands opposite Mahatma Gandhi Road, and east of Teen Darwaza, will find
no  signboard  and  none  of  the  usual  commemorative  marks  of  a  major  historical
landmark. The mosque is in fact surrounded by a row of insignificant shops selling cheap
knick-knacks, creating the impression of a small town bazaar and offering no hint of what
lies behind. Seeking to go there, I passed it by a few times myself, before I located the
entrance.  Nearly  invisible  to  passers-by,  the  mosque  has  a  doorway  that  is
undistinguished  and devoid  of  any  noticeable  sign.  Its  collapsible  steel  gate  is  itself
painted saffron, the hue of Hindutva in the city that adorns numerous signboards placed
by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in Ahmedabad.  One mounts the steps through saffron
portals that look back at the visitor, bearing the impress of Hindu town-planners and
municipal corporators who make the entry into the mosque possible, and seek to mark
this fact. Entering the structure, no visitor could fail to contrast the grandeur within and
the squalor without (Figures 1-3).
 
Figure 1. Street frontage bordering the fifteenth-century Jama Masjid in the old city
(photo by author)
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Figure 2. Street frontage bordering the fifteenth-century Jama Masjid in the old city
(photo by author)
 
Figure 3. Inside the Jama Masjid
(photo by author)
29 Through  a  series  of  adjustments  over  time,  a  separate  sense  of  space  has  come  to
characterize the old walled city as a whole;  once it  was the better part of  the city (
Figure 4) and today it has come to be treated as pathogenic, as a predictable place of
violence, and as an explanation for violence which may actually occur elsewhere, as was
the case in 2002.  In the old city,  Ahmedabad has maze-like lanes and tightly woven
residential neighbourhoods that are introvert with respect to the city but extrovert with
respect to the neighbourhood, allowing for internal policing by neighbours but rendering
surveillance difficult if not impossible for city authorities as was noted by the Justice
Reddy Inquiry Commission Report on the riots in Ahmedabad in 196913 (Figure 5).
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Figure 4. Pol Layout
(Source: Ahmedabad City Development Plan, 2006–2012)
 
Figure 5. Elite Location by 1970s
(Source: Sompura, 1983)
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30 Successive urban plans in fact retained the unsurveillable design of the old city,  that
favoured residents’ property interests at the expense of municipal agencies’ own
professed needs. Although in 2002, the main sites of the violence in the city were in fact
no longer within the walled city, but in settlements outside it such as Naroda Patia, it was
the  walled  city  that  continued  to  dominate  the  Hindu  imagination  as  a  source  of
inexhaustible danger, requiring repeated ‘combing operations’ by the police that seldom
failed to discover AK-47s and explosives, according to news reports in the Gujarati press
(Patel, Padgaonkar & Verghese, 2002: 6-7). This seemingly ineradicable sense of intrigue
and indeed ungovernability in the city provided the alibi during the 2002 pogrom for
continuing violence, and for selective law enforcement that targeted victims rather than
perpetrators. 
31 The  structured  marginalization  of  Muslims  acquires  a  natural  character  given  the
character of the urban design at work. This relates to the geographic specificity of the
violence in Ahmedabad: violence was mainly confined to the Muslim localities, suggesting
that  Hindus  were  spectators,  not  participants.14 As  the  city  grew,  residential  and
industrial  development  separated from each other  spatially,  as  in  many other  cities.
Although town planning legislation in the region began in 1915, ‘the concept of over-all
growth  was  totally  absent  in  phasing  various  town  planning  schemes’  for  decades,
according  to  the  1975  Ahmedabad  Draft  Development  Plan  (Ahmedabad  Municipal
Corporation  1985:  9).15 By  1965,  when  the  first  municipal  development  plan  was
sanctioned by the State Government, following the formation of the state of Gujarat in
1960, elites were able to resist the efforts of town planning authorities to acquire land for
public housing and other public purposes, and to uphold their own uses of their property
even where these did not conform to town planning schemes.
32 Now as  we  know,  colonial  urban  planning  in  India  reproduced  in  spatial  terms  the
prevalent racial distinction between rulers and ruled, maintaining well-manicured and
policed ‘cantonment’ or ‘civil lines’ where whites lived, while the ‘black town’ inhabited
by natives was crowded and unsanitary by comparison. The British cantonment (dating
from 1850) had itself been on the east bank, north from the walled city. As bridges were
built across the Sabarmati, beginning in 1870 with Ellis Bridge, Indian elites as well as
whites moved across the river, and residence on the western bank became a clear marker
of class status. Characteristics attributed to the ‘black town’ continued to be applied to
the walled city even after independence. It became the place to escape from, as residents
acquired the means to move. Over time, the spatial separation on either side of the river
acquired  a  Hindu-Muslim  definition,  with  Muslims  acquiring  a  disadvantaged  and
deprived status vis-à-vis Hindus.
33 As the city grew, elites moved out first from the walled city, going north towards the
British cantonment, and by the 1930s to the west of the river to Ellis Bridge and beyond.
The east remained the site of industries and of the lower classes, and movement to the
west signalled upward mobility. Private, residential construction dominated development
on the western side of the river for decades. When institutions took root there, these
were  predominantly  higher  education  institutes  serving  the  local  population,
encouraging further middle and upper class residential settlement in the area, and all of
these were situated on the western banks of the Sabarmati river, including S.L.D. Arts
College  in  1931,  H.L.  College  of  Commerce  in  1936,  M.G.  Science  Institute  in  1936,
L.M. Pharmacy  College  in  1947,  Gujarat  University  in  1949  and  several  thereafter
(Sompura 1973: 68). Middle and upper classes in Ahmedabad, who were mainly upper
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caste Hindus, managed to steer the course of urban development to make the western
side of the city effectively an upper caste Hindu enclave, albeit without walls. With the
exception  of  Juhapura,  Paldi  and  Navrangpura  Muslim  Society,  the  western  section
became almost entirely Hindu. Muslim ownership or rental of property became scarce in
the newer part of the city. Working and lower middle classes, including concentrations of
Muslims, dominated the eastern side of the city.
34 Muslims therefore faced the prospect of economic ghettoization as a consequence of their
spatial segregation. The Central Business District remained in the old city,  where the
industrial area grew in proximity to the railway station. But following the completion of
the  infrastructure  for  the  new  capital  city  of  Gandhinagar  in  1970,  commercial
establishments increasingly  began  to  be  located  in  the  west,  along  the  Sarkhej–
Gandhinagar  or  S.G.  Road.  Since around this  time,  C.G. Road (named after  Chimanlal
Gandalal, an Ahmedabad businessman) also began to draw businesses away from Ashram,
Gandhi  and  Relief  roads  in  the  east.  Although  seven  bridges  were  built  across  the
Sabarmati in the last century and a half, the resulting ease of movement did not result in
a uniform diffusion of people across the river.  Rather,  class and community loyalties
expanded and fortified in the more ample region west of the river. 
35 Housing  regulations  that  favoured group rather  than individual  investment,  offering
loans and insurance policies to ‘societies’ rather than persons, helped to reproduce caste
networks as people moved out of the old city into the new. When these groups moved
across  the  river  to  more  spacious  homes,  they  reproduced  their  spatial  proximity,
obtaining  loans  for  plots  in  new  housing  societies  contiguous  with  each  other.  The
Ahmedabad Guide of 1940 lists the Maharashtra Society, the Brahmakshatriya Society, the
Jain Society, the Saurashtra Society, the Patel Society, the Brahman Society and so on
(Sompura 1973: 69). More recent housing society names are unlikely to be so explicit but
their caste identity is seldom a secret.
36 If on the one hand, urban development improved transport and communication, unequal
access to the means of mobility ensured that existing social stratifications were not only
reproduced but acquired a stronger spatial definition. In the old city, the rich and the
poor  lived  in  close  proximity,  whereas  as  the  city  expanded west  of  the  Sabarmati,
greater distinctions could be produced across middle and upper classes. At the same time,
the percentage of the city’s population living in slums has grown over time, that is, while
the well-to-do achieved greater spatial separation not only from the poor but also with
respect to each other, for those who fell on the other side of the dividing line, there was a
blurring effect as poverty forced them together.16 Although the Gujarat State Housing
Board’s  welfare  initiatives  were among the more effective  ones  in the country,  they
effectively subsidized the better-off at the expense of the poorer classes, financing the
latter’s  homes  at  lower  rates,  and  demanding  higher  rates  of  return  on  their  hire-
purchase schemes (Paul 1985: 90).
37 Rigorous spatial  division became a means of anchoring a form of antipathy that was
diffused throughout the city. Muslims were spatially confined to a specific part of the
city, to its most crowded and poorest quarters. One Muslim told me: ‘Shahpur, Bapunagar,
Juhapura, Jamalpur—Muslims cannot live anywhere else in the city’.17 
38 The latest phase of ‘dividation’ began with the 1969 riots, with Muslims moving out of
Khadia and other areas in the walled city, and after the 1985 riots, there was a further
efflux  from  places  like  Teen  Darwaza,  whereas  Hindus  moved  out  of  areas  such  as
Shahpur. By 2002 most middle and upper classes could spend extended periods of time
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without ever seeing a Muslim, or knowing that they did, which amounted to the same
thing.18 Amidst the rarity of contact, antagonism towards Muslims led to curious stories
circulating without corroboration. The young daughter of a couple I knew reported one
day that the mother of a friend said that Muslims made rotis (flat bread) by kneading
dough with their feet.  Coming from such a source,  their daughter believed what she
heard.19 There were other stories and incidents, not all fantastical, but like the above,
emerging to conjure a peculiar form of sociality in the absence of much real interaction.
39 A young friend working in the publicity office of a hospital laughingly told me about a
Muslim classmate, Irfan Syed, who lived in Gomtipur: ‘he was such a good guy, we told
him he was not a Muslim, or else he was a stain on the reputation of his community’.
Since he assumed that Muslims were all alike, and bad, Irfan’s being an exception was
something funny.20 The same friend told me why it was that a mob had gathered around
the former MP Ehsan Jafri’s home on 11 March 2002: ‘Jafri was a bad character, involved
in all kinds of crimes. The newspapers cannot report these things’.21 To know the truth it
was necessary to draw on informal knowledge; the news by itself could be misleading, he
was telling me. This was not always the case, however; at times newspapers themselves
purveyed  rumours,  which  I  heard  from  informants,  as  with  a  young  chartered
accountant, who once took me aside and said very earnestly, ‘If we had not attacked, they
would  have  finished  us  off,  I  am  telling  you.’  It  was  a  rare  acknowledgement  of
participation,  but defended as a response to an imminent ‘Pakistani  terrorist  attack,’
rumours reported as news in Sandesh and other Gujarati papers.22
40 A retired city planner, while lucidly explaining the shifts over time in the growth of the
city, remarked: ‘Once a single Muslim comes he will start misbehaving. He will eat ‘non-
veg’ food, employ abusive language, adopt improper clothing, bring in his relations and
other visitors—naturally Hindu community will be affected. But Hindus let go; they are
liberal’.
41 A single Muslim, in this account, was a contagion of bad etiquette and vice, requiring
defences that Hindus, in their innocence, lacked. But although I did not question him on
his views, he himself proceeded to caution me: ‘Don’t tell the students in the UK (sic) that
there is a rift between Hindus and Muslims. There is no rift. Only one percent are creating
[it]’  (Fieldnotes 2004). He saw me as an emissary to the west and sought to project a
harmonious image; the divisive behaviour of Muslims ought to be private knowledge. He
made this remark not long after televised massacres of Muslims by Hindus. If this was an
older, Congress narrative about communal concord, it contrasted with his own common
sense about Muslims as bad citizens. It suggested how antagonism signalled not only a
stratified social discourse but could lead to a multiplication of historical voice without an
ability to manage its internal disparateness.
42 The relationship between stratified social space and antipathy to Muslims is hardly one-
to-one,  as  if  spatial  distance  made Hindus  vulnerable  to  supporting violence  against
Muslims.  The  proliferation of  rumour  indicates  both the  withdrawal  of  agency  from
violence and an attempt to reconstitute it in language. This suggests membership in a
collective  without  acknowledging  the  initiative  of joining  it.  Increasing  reliance  on
rumour follows from the eroding credibility of official systems of mass communication,
but in conveying the sense of a society that can univocally be spoken for, it reproduces
the splintering of social discourse. Here, rumour and violence each confirms the inability
of society to cohere, and in this respect they mirror each other (Feldman 1995: 230-32).
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43 The sparsely filled space of actual contact with Muslims was thus compensated for by a
sociality produced by rumour. Not all of it was hostile, but in each case my informants
distinguished between what was known and what ought to be known, between misleading
public facts, and informal or secret theories required to complement and correct those
facts.  Individual  judgment  could  not  rely  on  the  evidence  of  one’s  senses,  by  such
accounts.
44 It was on empirical grounds that Muslims criticized Hindu rumours. During one public
occasion, I encountered an elderly bearded Muslim remarking:
You  can  go  to  mosques  and  see  what  they  are  doing  there.  There  are  no
underground cells where they are conducting terrorist or anti-national activities.
Anyone can come into a mosque—no one will stop you. There was a swami—what is
his name?—Swami Sachchidanand! He used to say the idols in a temple are made of
gold and silver, and are hence likely to be stolen. In a mosque nothing can be stolen
because there is nothing of value there!23
45 The bare austerity of the mosque corresponded, for this person, to the pure piety of what
went on there, in contrast to the Hindu need for expensive idols for worship. Just as
Hindus were not independent in prayer, and placed a false value on worldly wealth, they
placed a false value on the authority of others for their information, he seemed to imply.
His complaint pointed to his conviction that Hindu hostility was resistant to evidence,
perhaps  for  peculiarly  Hindu  reasons,  placing  Muslims  on  the  side  of  reason  and
rationality in a typical gesture of defiance.
 
Conclusion
46 In  what  ways  does  the  violence  of  Gujarat  in  2002  mark a  departure  from previous
episodes of violence in India? Upendra Baxi has argued that it signalled the formal onset
of what he called ‘holocaustian politics’, politics that rendered the state into a mechanism
for subordinating the minority to the majority, and ensuring that submission became the
only mode of existence for the former. Communalized governance had become the object
of the state, rendering minorities into permanently endangered subjects, Baxi argued,
distinguishing such governance in terms of three key components. First, the state was to
champion  the  principle  of  collective  guilt  and  responsibility,  negating  the  idea  of
individual  rights.  Second,  the  right  of  the  majority  to  commit  violence  against  the
minority was to be upheld and encouraged, for reasons of revenge, and self-defence as
well as future deterrence, rendering the majority community into a de facto force of law,
and thereby educating minorities into the form of citizenship available to them. This
indicated a third crucial fact, namely that the rule of law in India had come to constitute a
reign of terror, signalling a broad consensus legitimating organized political violence.
Analysts  of  Indian  politics  needed  to  confront  the  difficult  and  unpalatable  task  of
theorizing these new realities, Baxi urged (2002).
47 What Baxi did not discuss was the broader political-economic conjuncture that enabled
the anti-Muslim pogroms, which succeeded in simultaneously regionalizing the violence
of 2002, and accommodating it to a global neoliberal context.
48 Although the BJP government was replaced at the Centre after Baxi wrote his essay, the
Chief Minister of Gujarat accused of masterminding the violence came to be lauded by
corporate  India  and touted as  the answer to  India’s  apparent  ungovernability.  Court
proceedings  and  inquiry  commissions  have  been  initiated,  but  like  other  juridical
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processes  that  followed previous acts  of  mass  violence in India,  served to delay and
perhaps deny justice, while simulating due process. Federalism, from being a guarantee of
limiting  centralization  of  state  authority,  becomes  a  means  to  make  human  rights
violations into an internal matter for state governments. Popular elections, instead of
expressing  democratic  rights  against  established  elite  power,  can  become  a  way  of
overwriting existing laws and absolving crimes against humanity; this is clearly what the
BJP sought to accomplish in Gujarat, at any rate. State institutions designed to serve the
people regardless of their community or creed were turned into means for ensuring that
the  rights  of  a  minority  were  negated,  while  activist  groups  and  news  media  that
challenged such discrimination themselves become targets of vilification, as anti-people
or anti-national (Baxi 2002).
49 The mimicking of anti-colonial politics for very different purposes by the postcolonial
state suggests the inadequacy of the conventional repertoire of liberal and activist forms
of politics, with their reliance on putative state impartiality combined with public protest
to appeal to wider sympathies. In this case neither the one nor the other was available in
very great measure, at least domestically—as a result of which appeals to international
audiences and organizations were made, which then could be used to reinforce claims of 
anti-nationalism by the state.
50 I  argued  above  that  Gujarat’s  exceptional  ‘success’  as  the  poster  child  of  neoliberal
development  was  complemented  by  the  manner  in which  it  had  normalized  an
exceptional social order predicated on accelerated practices of social segregation, which
in turn enabled anti-Muslim violence (and its  rhetorical  justification).  Urban growth,
economic  development  and  ghettoization  operated  in  tandem  in  Ahmedabad, with
patterns  of  spatial  expansion  and  capital  accumulation  together  working  to  force
Muslims  more  closely together into  spatial  proximity  and  social  intimacy,  while
rendering the rest of the city as a canvas for Hindu aspirations. These aspirations can be
clarified  by  considering  spatial  arrangements  as  they  impact  on  urban  perception.
Various forms of structural and phenomenal violence in Ahmedabad became naturalized
to the point where their results were seen as attributes of Muslims themselves or as the
results of their behaviour, rather than as a consequence of conditions imposed on them.
The form of public communication in which these conditions were reproduced relied not
on transparency but on a structure of secrecy and surveillance, dividing the population
into surveilled and surveilling sections, with the former understood to be different and
the latter believing itself to be normal. Violence is not external to the reproduction of
this system of communication, but one of its constitutive components.
51 My argument about the relay between the special economic and political zones as both a
symptom and a form for understanding the specificity of Indian globalization, can be
understood at  two levels.  First,  it  asks us to view ‘Gujarat’  as  signalling the possible
consolidation  of  a  set  of  relationships  between  political  violence  and  economic
globalization, between an accelerated emphasis on regional identity, or Gujarati asmita, 
on the one hand, and the globalization of Gujarati business classes on the other as a
circuit  secured  by  the  performance  of  anti-Muslim  violence. The  forms  of  spatial
segregation,  economic  marginalization,  and  ultimately,  of  Muslim ghettoization  have
taken over the Gujarati public sphere even as they have rendered the English sphere
suspect and non-authentic, thus aiding in remaking political common sense. Second, my
argument regarding the special political zone points to a broader politics of vision and of
visibility; it is an integral, if inadequate element in the production of a perceptual field
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where  Muslim  vulnerability  and  spatial  segregation  are  mutually  entailed  in  the
remaking of political common sense. It is this longer-term production of vulnerability
that I  have addressed here, in order to clarify the place of anti-Muslim violence in a
neoliberal order where the logic of economic and of political exception interlace with
each other.
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NOTES
2. The  campaign  to  demolish  the  Babri  Masjid  in  Ayodhya  culminated  under  a  BJP-led
government in Uttar Pradesh, in 1992. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao at the time argued
that since law and order was a state subject, the central government could not intervene despite
the threat to public safety in Uttar Pradesh. Hence the demolition went unhindered, albeit under
the watch of tens of thousands of security personnel from the Central Reserve Police Force, the
Border  Security  Force,  the  Railway  Protection  Force  and  other  armed  units.  See  Citizens’
Tribunal on Ayodhya, 1993. For a brilliant critical assessment of the implications of the events in
Gujarat soon after the violence, see Baxi (2002). Baxi sets out some of the terms of the theoretical
and political challenges before critics posed by the Gujarat violence, and concludes with some
(understandably) modest proposals for policy intervention. While he describes the ‘holocaustian’
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turn  of  political  outcomes,  my  own  essay  seeks  to  uncover  infrastructural  conditions and
perceptual practices that assist in the conduct of, as well as the denial of violence.
3. Declared to be public utilities under the Industrial Disputes Act, strikes are illegal in SEZs. The
precursor to the SEZ, the Export Processing Zone or EPZ, was first established in Kandla, Gujarat,
in 1965, to replace the deepwater port facilities lost in Karachi, following Partition. The port of
Kandla itself was inaugurated about a decade earlier.  By the 1990s, the provision came to be
treated mainly as a regulatory loophole to be exploited by businesses. What mainly resulted then
were schemes to acquire real estate, and often, windfall profits,  while avoiding taxation, and
relying on existing public infrastructure without contributing to it in any way. See Rajagopalan
(2010: 6). A special report on the state of Gujarat’s economy in one of the business papers reports
that exports from Gujarat’s SEZs accounted for over rupees 1 trillion—of the total exports of
rupees 2 trillion from all of India’s SEZs in 2009-10 (Pathak & Damor 2010: 3).
4. State-led economic development itself is conducted like an emergency, to be sure. Here what I
am pointing to is the regularization of governmental discourse in this respect. The abbreviations
cited are VIP: Very Important Person, for whom exceptions of all kinds are routinely made; MOU:
Memorandum  of  Understanding,  for  example,  between  the  government  and  a  company,
outlining the terms on which rights may be granted to the company in return for its anticipated
contribution to the exchequer; RTI: the Right to Information (Act), used by citizens applying to
have specific items of information released by petitioning the PIO or Public Information Officer
of any government department. RTI can be seen as an indirect example of my point: in a context
where few demands for information can be made of the government without provoking suspicion
or in fact, being rejected, the RTI Act of 2005 made available a limited right, namely the right to
obtain a response about whether a precisely designated piece of information could be provided,
and if not, to disclose that such information could in fact not be disclosed.
5. Article 53, SEZ Act, 2005.
6. My discussion here draws on Agamben’s work, but seeks to extend his discussion from sites
that he mainly focuses on such as the concentration camp to the domain of political economy as
such. See Agamben (1998, 2001).
7. See Geddes (1915a).  See also the note by the Consulting Surveyor to the Government A.E.
Mirams, dated August 25, 1915, expressing his reservation about identifying Geddes’s views as
those  of  the  government.  Mirams  himself,  in  his  ‘Report  on  the  Ahmedabad  City  Wall
Improvement  Scheme  of  1919’,  later  proposed  the  demolition  of  the  walls  altogether
(Government of Bombay, Revenue Department (‘28’ Series), File no 1086/28 I, pp. 323-35; File no
 1086/28 III, pp. 301-5; AMR, no 143, 1st quarter, 1921-2, pp. 109-11, 121. Cited in Raychaudhuri
(2001:  694)).  Geddes’  arguments were  themselves  in  line  with  the  City  and  Town  Planning
Exhibitions  that  had  become  an  influential  vehicle  for  inculcating urban  planning  as  a
governmental activity. Geddes visited India after Lord Pentland, the Governor of Madras, invited
him to visit and enlighten municipal authorities on the subject of town planning, in 1914. The
Town and City Planning Act of 1909 had been an outcome of efforts Geddes was involved in, and
his City and Town Planning Exhibitions, which he designed as an educational tool, had begun to
gain  popularity.  See  Geddes  (1915b).  For  a  discussion  of  Geddes’  work  in  relation  to  recent
debates see Welter (2002).
8. My reference here is however only to two city plan documents, cited elsewhere in this article.
9. This data is theoretically available to the public, but in practice can prove hard to obtain.
Meanwhile,  the population density of the walled city area is  said to have reached saturation
levels, and the number of persons per hectare has reduced from 716 in 1971, 599 in 1981 and 560
in 1991, the most recent year for which figures are available. Over the same period, the number
of persons per hectare in the western AUDA (or Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority) area
has increased from 13 in 1971,  28 in 1981 and 43 in 1991,  and the corresponding figures for
eastern Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) have grown from 79 in 1971, 134 in 1981 and 
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78  in  1991.  Both  of  these  areas  have  concentrations  of  Muslim  populations  (Centre  for
Environmental  Planning  and  Technology/Gujarat  Infrastructure  Development  Board  2005/
Ahmedabad Bus Rapid Transit System, Report no1, cited in City Development Plan, 13).
10. Thus, for example, the number of registered workers in Ahmedabad has remained unchanged
for  four  decades,  while  the  population  has  more  than  doubled,  and  the  area  measured  as
Ahmedabad has itself grown. See in this context Breman (2003).
11. The official picture is upbeat, however. In this connection it maybe relevant that, according
to the Census of India, Ahmedabad’s slum population as a percentage of its total population was
13.5 in 2001, while the corresponding all-India figure was 24.1%. 
12. Fieldnotes 2008.
13. See Reddy 1969.
14. In 2002 however, the newer settlements outside the old city became targets of violence. In
these areas, recent migrants to the city were more numerous, and presumably presented softer
targets than older and more well-entrenched residents.
15. The  basic  concept  of  town  planning  involved,  on  this  account,  ‘pulling  together  all  the
ownership of the area and redistributing it in a proper reconstituted form after acquiring the
lands for social  infrastructure and super-imposing a road network in the area’.  Housing and
public uses of urban space (in addition to roads) were to be regulated by action against non-
conforming users by acquiring their lands. However, courts ruled that the Municipal Corporation
had no power to force ‘non-conforming’ owners to obey its injunctions. This was the case of
Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad filed Criminal Appeal no 382/1968 against Asarwa Bobin
Works, in a case decided by the Gujarat High Court on 9 March 1970, for non-conforming uses of
its property, for which it had not sought permission from the AMC. In addition, the 1975 Plan
proposed the acquisition of 400 acres for public housing, while acquiring other lands for ‘various
public purposes’  (1985:  10-11) but the Revenue Department of the state government issued a
circular  (no LAQ /2269/LA/IV/20-6-1970)  ordering  all  acquisition  proceedings  to  cease.  In
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (Town Development Department) Draft: Revised Development
Plan 1975-1985. Sanctioned by Administrator under Resolution no 1535, dated 26-12-1985.
16. In this respect the experience of Muslims was akin to that of the poor as a whole, though it
was laden with additional layers of social stigma, to say nothing of the campaign for economic
boycott against them. In 1961, 17.67% of households lived in slums. By 1971 this grew to 24.7%, by
1981, 31.82%, and by 1996-1997, to 41.1%. Sompura (1983: 83) except for the 1996-1997 figure,
which is from Dutta & Batley (1999: 39). The figures from Dutta & Batley for 1981 do not agree
with those in Sompura, however.
17. Fieldnotes 2004.
18. For example, some Muslims I encountered had taken Hindu names, and avoided any visible
markers of their religious identity, while working in Hindu-owned businesses in the western part
of the city.  Traveling from Naroda Patia to the Satellite area once by rickshaw, my rickshaw
driver, who guessed that I had never been to his area before, disclosed that similarly he had
never been to mine. All along the way, he stopped at provisions stores, auto-mechanic stands,
and  other  businesses  to  inquire  how  to  proceed,  and  in  each  case  he  approached  an
establishment he believed was Muslim-owned, judging by discreet signs indicating the owners’
identity, such as a few letters written with chalk on a board, or painted on a sign. A parallel
circuit  lay  across  the  city  that  an  enterprising  person  could  utilize,  that  Hindus  would  not
necessarily know about (Fieldnotes, Ahmedabad, March-April 2004).
19. Fieldnotes 2004.
20. This young man, whom I will call Pravin, went on to tell me that this Muslim friend and his
brothers were hauled off to police custody for several days, and badly beaten there, for no fault
of theirs. The family moved to Hyderabad thereafter, Pravin said. The injustice done to his friend
and his friend’s family, who were the only Muslims he knew, were incidental in relation to what
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in  Pravin’s  mind  was  the  essential  fact,  namely  that  Muslims  as  a  whole  were  criminal
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suggestions during these presentations. I would also like to thank the people who have helped in
my research and writing, including Binu Alex, Bharat Desai, Rubina Jasani, Brij Kothari, Anosh
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published  in  South  Asian  History  and  Culture,  1(4),  October  2010,  pp. 529-552,  entitled  ‘Special
political  zone:  urban  planning,  spatial  segregation  and  the  infrastructure  of  violence  in
Ahmedabad’,  reprinted  by  permission  of  the  publisher  (Taylor  and  Francis  Ltd,  http://
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In  this  paper  I  inquire  into  how  the  disposition  of  public  spaces  and  informal  oral
communication, can together create a commonsense mobilizing support for spectacular events of
violence. The built form of the city, urban planning and resulting forms of social segregation, and
popular linguistic practices, can combine to instantiate new political formations such as what I
am  calling  a  Special  Political  Zone,  where  the  form  of  rule  exercised  is  both  modern  and
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